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1. Introduction 
Most investment decisions are forward looking and therefore associated with risks 
and uncertainties. However, well-functioning institutions can mitigate these uncertainties 
through various channels. First, they can enhance contract enforcement and restrain arbitrary 
state action. Second, they can lower transaction and information costs and thus increase net 
returns. Third, they can reduce the likelihood of distortionary macroeconomic policies and, 
hence, boost the investment climate (Acemoglu et al., 2003). Thus, a positive relationship 
between institutions and private investment is expected.  
 Recently, a growing body of evidence has emerged emphasising the importance of 
property rights institutions (PRI) for economic performance (see for example, Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005). A related literature (for example, La Porta et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2002) 
has also convincingly shown that PRI encourage the development of financial market 
institutions. Financial markets, in turn, can serve as a vehicle for increased economic activity 
through risk diversification, corporate control, and resource mobilisation (Levine, 1997). 
 This note contributes to this literature by addressing the related issue of whether PRI 
and financial development (FD) act as substitutes or complements in explaining private 
investment. The joint effect of institutions and finance on economic performance is 
increasingly being explored since their individual effect has become clearer. For example, 
Compton and Giedeman (2011) and Ahlin and Pang (2008) find that the positive effect of FD 
on growth diminishes with the level of institutional development (i.e. they are substitutes in 
improving economic performance). 
Our results reinforce these findings and suggest that PRI and FD act as substitutes in 
encouraging private investment. More specifically, we find that PRI promote increased 
private investment especially in countries where the financial system is either inadequate or 
perhaps missing. One possible channel through which this can happen is, for example, 
through the provision of some of the functions of the financial sector including trade 
facilitation, corporate control and risk reduction.  
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data and empirical strategy. 
Section 3 discusses the results while Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Empirical Strategy 
The dataset consists of 79 developing and emerging economies over the period 1970 
to 1999. As is common in the literature, we average the data over 5-year periods in order to 
reduce possible business cycle effects that may influence private investment. Table A1 in the 
appendix provides the definition and sources of the variables. We estimate the following 
dynamic panel model:  
 
                                                                                   
where for country i at time t,      is the ratio of private investment to GDP. To capture PRI, 
we use ‘constraint on the executive’ from the Polity IV dataset. This is following Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005) who make a strong case for the appropriateness of this indicator as a 
measure of PRI. According to them, this proxy captures procedural rules which constrain 
political leaders and other powerful elites, and, thus is closely linked with the security of 
private property rights. To measure FD, we use financial system deposits as a ratio to GDP. 
This variable captures the volume of resources available to the financial system for its 
lending activities and thus is an appropriate proxy for the depth of the financial sector (Beck 
et al. 2010).            is the interaction of institutions with finance. A significant positive 
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interaction term implies that institutions and finance are complementary, suggesting that 
sophisticated financial sectors increase the beneficial effect of PRI on private investment. On 
the contrary, a significant negative interaction term points to the substitutability of the two 
variables, such that the positive effect of PRI on investment is stronger the weaker the 
financial sector.  
The vector     contains a set of standard controls including GDP growth, inflation, real 
lending rate, macroeconomic volatility, currency overvaluation, and economic openness,    is 
time invariant country-specific fixed effect,    is a time specific effect and      is the error 
term. In estimating equation (1), we use the two-step system GMM estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which addresses potential 
endogeneity, measurement error and omitted variable biases. 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 reports the results. Column (1) presents the basic specification that includes both 
PRI and measures of FD but no interaction term. All the variables have the expected signs 
and are predominantly significant at conventional levels. More specifically, the coefficient on 
PRI is highly significant, suggesting that, on average, countries with strong property rights 
tend to have higher shares of investment in GDP. One explanation for this could be that 
countries that limit the exercise of arbitrary power are more likely to mitigate the 
uncertainties associated with investment projects by, for example, reducing expropriation 
risks. This is in line with the results of a broader research agenda showing the positive effects 
of institutions on private investment and on economic performance in general (see for 
example, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Escaleras and Thomakos, 2008). 
As expected, we find a significant positive relationship between financial development 
and private investment. This is consistent with the idea that financial sector development 
enables higher financial intermediation by facilitating trade and channelling investment funds 
to their most efficient use and thereby promoting investment.  
In columns (2) and (3), we examine whether the relationship between PRI and investment 
works through the financial sector by augmenting the basic specification with an interaction 
term between PRI and FD. The results show that the interaction term carries a significant 
negative sign while property rights are positively and significantly related to investment. This 
suggests that the positive effect of PRI on private investment diminishes with the level of FD. 
Put it differently, strong property rights have increased private investment in countries with 
poorer financial sectors. For example, since PRI underpin the enforcement of financial 
contracts, for example, high quality institutions may have also directly provided other 
essential functions including corporate control, trade facilitation and risk reduction and 
thereby enhanced private investment. In addition, they may have reduced transaction and 
information costs which are essential for private investment. This is in line with the findings 
of Compton and Giedeman (2011) and Ahlin and Pang (2008). 
In column (3), the key results remain unchanged when we include additional variables. 
More importantly, the results point to the importance of PRI and FD for private investment. 
Moreover, the interaction term retains its significant negative sign, emphasising the 
substitutability of PRI and FD. 
Across the different specifications, we find that economic growth and openness boost 
private investment while inflation and real lending rates along with macroeconomic volatility 
hinder it. In contrast, currency overvaluation does not seem to have any explanatory power on 
private investment
1
. 
                                                             
1 The central findings hold if we use liquid liabilities (a measure of the size of financial intermediaries) as an indicator of 
financial development. Results available upon request. 
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Finally, the validity of the instruments is not rejected as the specifications pass the 
Hansen J test for over-identifying restrictions. They also pass the Difference-in-Hansen test 
for the exogeneity of the instrument subset and the Arellano-Bond test for second order serial 
correlation. 
 
Table 1: Property Rights Institutions, Financial Depth and Private Investment 
Notes: 2- step system GMM estimates. Dependent variable is private investment/ GDP. *, ** and *** denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Windmeijer corrected  SEs in parenthesis.  The Hansen test reports the p-values for 
the null of instrument validity.  The Diff Hansen reports the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restrictions 
required for the 2-step SGMM.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This note presents evidence which shows that PRI and FD promote private investment 
in developing countries. More importantly, the analysis indicates that the impact of PRI on 
investment varies with the level of financial sector development, such that a strong PRI 
increase private investment especially in countries where the financial system is either 
missing or inadequate. On the contrary, well-functioning financial systems do not seem to 
increase the beneficial effect of property rights on investment. We postulate that this is so 
because well-functioning institutions can perform similar functions to sophisticated financial 
systems including the reduction of information and transaction costs and thereby enhance 
private investment in the absence of well developed financial sectors.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PI (-1) 0.456 
[0.113]*** 
0.456 
[0.166]*** 
0.507 
[0.165]*** 
Growth 0.353 
[0.156]** 
0.364 
[0.173]** 
0.429 
[0.168]** 
Real lending  rate -0.155 
[0.075]** 
-0.178 
[0.071]** 
-0.169 
[0.061]*** 
Ln (1+ inflation) -1.739 
[0.979]* 
-1.673 
[0.906]* 
-1.298 
[0.710]* 
Economic openness 0.139 
[0.079]* 
0.154 
[0.077]** 
0.158 
[0.081]* 
PRI 0.066 
[0.020]*** 
0.362 
[0.142]** 
0.369 
[0.166]** 
FD 8.998 
[4.052]** 
14.218 
[5.464]*** 
13.261 
[4.975]*** 
PRI x FD  
 
-1.322 
[0.584]** 
-1.339 
[0.655]** 
Macro volatility  
 
 
 
-0.000 
[0.000]* 
Overvaluation  
 
 
 
0.004 
[0.008] 
Time effect  Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant 3.583 
[4.958] 
2.241 
[3.815] 
-0.035 
[3.367] 
# of observations 198 198 193 
# of instruments  42 43 45 
Hansen  test 0.693 0.737 0.832 
Diff Hansen test 0.710 0.579 0.701 
AR(1) test  0.022 0.028 0.029 
AR(2) test  0.437 0.267 0.262 
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Table A1: Data description 
Variable Source 
PI Private investment as a share of GDP. Source: Easterly-Yu dataset available at 
http://www.macrorules.com/mhopkins/datasets.html. 
 
PRI Property rights institutions measured by ‘constraint on the executive’ from the 
Polity IV dataset. A 7-point scale where higher values imply strong property 
rights. Source: Marshall et al. (2009) available online at 
www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
 
FD Financial development is captured by financial system deposits as a share of GDP.  
This variable is measured as the ratio of all checking, savings, and time deposits in 
financial institutions to economic activity. Source: Beck et al. (2010) available at  
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
 
Growth Real per capita growth. Source: WDI (2010). Available online at  
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/economic-policy-and-external-debt 
 
Inflation Measured by the GDP deflator. Source: WDI, 2010. Available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/economic-policy-and-external-debt 
 
Real lending rate Lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. 
Source: WDI (2010) Available online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/financial-sector 
 
Macro volatility Proxied by the relative standard deviation of money growth. Source: WDI (2010). 
Underlying data on money growth available online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/financial-sector 
 
Overvaluation Measured by the degree to which the domestic currency deviates from PPP. 
Source: Easterly-Yu dataset available online at 
http://www.macrorules.com/mhopkins/datasets.html. 
 
Economic openness Measured by actual flows of trade and investment and their restrictions. Source: 
Dreher (2006). Available online at  http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
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